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This article taps into the experience of creating regional human rights regimes in 
three different regions in order to extract certain commonalities that help create 
an analytical framework that is valid across the board. It then positions the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights into the so-constructed framework in order to 
examine the extent to which the two are compatible with each other. While the 
Charter clearly lends itself to analysis through reference to the framework’s four 
main dimensions – historical context, regional ethics, strong commitment to 
implementation and jus commune – it also introduces two additional ones. These 
stem from the particular context within which the Charter was created and are 
related to its purpose of legitimising the EU integration project and giving it a 
written constitutional form. Although the Charter presents itself as a peculiar case 
among the analysed regional human rights regimes, the article argues that on the 
most fundamental level its kinship with the family of international human rights 




The present article is an attempt to construct and operationalise a tentative 
analytical framework conceptualising the establishment of regional human rights 
regimes. For this purpose, it first draws upon the experience of three regions and 
the regimes they have established in order to extract the framework’s dimensions. 
Subsequently, the article takes up the case of the EU10 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and searches for the possible analytical implications of its creation. Both 
levels, the regional and the sub-regional (i.e. the EU) are treated as locations in 
which sources of explanations for the observed phenomena, the creation of human 
                                                 
* Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at SPIRIT-Europe, Aalborg University. A special word of gratitude is 
due to Staffan Zetterholm who made valuable comments to an earlier draft of this article. 
10 Hereinafter referred to as the European Union, or the Union, regardless of the period. 
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rights regimes, can be found (Buzan 1995:199). In this sense, they are 
distinguished ontologically as being different units of analysis. The main purpose 
of the article is to establish whether they should also be distinguished along the 
second of Moul’s (1973:495) principles, epistemologically, as introducing 
different variables in explaining the particular outcome. 
Conceptually, the article bases itself on regime theory in international relations, 
broadened by the specificity introduced by the subject-matter of human rights 
regimes, and on the two  contrasting positions regarding the reasons and motives 
of states to create them. The purpose of the theoretical discussion is to come up 
with relevant analytical dimensions that help construct a conceptual framework 
for the analysis of regional human rights regimes. Although they exhibit a number 
of differences in terms of the type of rights they codify and the implementation 
mechanisms they contain, the article claims that they can be explained through 
reference to fundamental characteristics shared among them.  
Structurally, the article is divided in two parts. At the outset, the presentation is 
focused on the tenets of regime theory and the two resulting perspectives on the 
creation of human rights regimes. It is argued that the latter widen the scope of 
regime theory by introducing the notion of normative motivation drawing on a 
purportedly universalisable sense of justice besides the idea of self-interest. 
Subsequently, human rights regimes span this widened scope of regime theory as 
they are the outcome of varied calculations. It is thus possible to observe a 
combination of interest and ideology in any of them and this forms the 
fundamental background to their analysis. Through reference to three regional 
human rights regimes, the article defines four conceptual dimensions of such 
analysis: historical context, regional ethics, strong commitment to implementation 
and jus commune.  
In the second part, the article takes up the case of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in order to ascertain whether the so constructed analytical framework is 
adequate for its analysis or whether the Charter presents it with irreconcilable 
conceptual tensions. Although the Charter lends itself to discussion through 
reference to the four analytical dimensions, it also introduces two additional ones 
– legitimacy and constitutionalism. Because of the specificity of the European 
Union, any consideration of the Charter that does not incorporate the latter is 
necessarily incomplete. In view of this, the answer to the question posed in the 
second part of the article is negative. 
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REGIME THEORY AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
In international relations (IR), states often resort to regulating their cooperation in 
the form of specific regimes, which postulate the expected behaviour in given 
areas and ensure, with more or less rigour, that the norms they contain are 
complied with. The abundance of such regimes codifying the regulation of various 
sites where states’ interests meet and interact, ranging from the regulation of 
waterways navigation, through trade, monetary and environmental policies, to 
nuclear weapons non-proliferation, has given rise to a strand within IR thought 
dealing exclusively with their formation, functioning and place within the wider 
theoretical foundations of the discipline. Through its focus of study and the host 
of relevant insights generated thereof, regime theory has “made considerable 




Regime theory is the outcome of the analytical endeavour to articulate a concept 
that captures and explains the multiple patterns of interaction observed among 
states in their relations (Keohane and Nye 1977, Krasner 1983a, Keohane 1989a, 
Rittberger 1995, Hasenclever et al. 1996). One of the widest definitions of 
regimes sees them as “patterned behaviour” (Puchala and Hopkins 1983:26), thus 
encompassing an enormous set of phenomena in interstate interaction. Limiting 
those to the explicit agreement among governments within a given policy area, 
Keohane (1989b:4) defined regimes as “institutions with explicit rules, agreed 
upon by governments, which pertain to particular sets of issues in international 
relations”. The prevailing definition, however, was provided by Krasner (1983b:2) 
who was much more inclusive by claiming that international regimes are “implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.  
Although the last definition offered to widen the scope of regime contents by 
acknowledging the importance of principles and norms besides rules and 
considered them in their implicit character as well, Krasner preserved the 
overwhelming focus on material self-interest behind regime formation and 
functioning. For the latter to be effective and indeed possible, some sense of 
common interest was perceived as an indispensable condition. Young (1994) 
supported this claim in observing that, despite the acknowledged need for a 
regime regulating environmental policy, the divergence of economic goals 
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between industrialised and less developed nations makes its formation difficult. 
And since the interests underlying any regime are articulated in the structure of 
preferences within individual countries, the more convergence and overlap among 
them, the higher the success in implementing the regime (Milner 1997). 
All of the above inevitably invites the question of whether international human 
rights instruments should be considered within the framework of regime theory 
and whether, in fact. they deserve the label “regimes” at all. They do represent 
institutions with explicit rules agreed upon by governments, and they also imply 
the convergence of actors’ expectations, but do they really pertain to an area of 
international relations? Their subject matter being the regulation of relations 
between rulers and ruled within political communities,11 human rights instruments 
are perhaps more aptly categorised as a phenomenon of domestic-political rather 
than international-relations importance. However, on the account that by signing 
up to international human rights instruments governments accept a commitment 
towards the other government-parties to that instrument, the last claim is 
unreasonable and the natural belonging of such instruments to the area of 
interstate relations seems uncontested. With respect to this, human rights 
instruments naturally belong to the family of international regimes at a 
fundamental level: the fact of state acceptance of certain normative and procedural 
constraints as legitimate and of international authority replacing a certain area of 
the original national sovereignty (Donnelly, 1986:602). Human rights thus 
represent just another issue-area in which states choose to renounce parts of their 
sovereign national authority through an international regime, in order to reduce 
the costs of anarchy.   
It is in another related aspect, that their conceptualisation within regime theory is 
more problematic and here it is the theory that widens and adapts, rather than the 
idea of human rights instruments. Analysing them, Beitz (2003) posed the thesis 
that they do not only institutionalise existing interaction. On the contrary, being 
normative standards within various political arenas, they propagate change and 
ideals. Because of its nature, human rights codification attracts a host of 
normative thinking basing itself on a purportedly universalisable sense of justice 
rather than on the idea of self-interest. It is precisely the seeming irreconcilability 
between these two that Hurrell (1995) took as his cue in making the case for 
expanding the focus of regime theory. In his analysis, human rights codification 
 
11 According to Jones (1994:3), human rights developed in the mid-eighteenth century as political 
instruments fulfilling the function of checks upon political power. 
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came as a useful tool to conceptualise the relation between law and norms on the 
one hand, and power and interests on the other beyond the narrowing view of 
seeing the former as simply a reflection of the latter.  
The argument can be advanced in two steps. Firstly, the sustained interaction of 
states within the international system develops quasi-societal qualities by 
generating the interest of maintaining common rules and institutions often based 
on normative considerations (see Bull and Watson 1984). Secondly, the existence 
of such qualities of interaction, implying a degree of common identity among its 
actors, is indispensable for the creation and functioning of any regulatory regime 
(Buzan 1993). Within this idea, Hurell (1995) saw international law as the 
political foundation that is necessary before regimes can come into play. The 
degree of identity sharing in this sense ranges from the mutual recognition of 
sovereign actor-ness (minimal) to the acceptance of the fundamental values of the 
other as one’s own (maximal). This view is consistent with Kratochwil’s 
influential contentions that classic regime theory is characterized by an egregious 
lack of familiarity with legal theory (1984:344) and that the conception of law as a 
coercive order needs revision (1984:345). 
The above presents the case for widening the scope of regime theory by inserting 
normative considerations into the process of preference formation by participating 
actors. International human rights regimes12 create another pole in its 
categorisation structure where cooperation is prompted not exclusively by the 
states’ self-interest, but also by legitimate normative thinking resulting from their 
perception of shared identity and the need to preserve the established political 
order, both domestically and internationally. As much as human rights regimes 
are defined by material state interest (e.g. Britain and the regime of abolishing 
slave trade in the eighteenth century), they are also the product of defending 
shared values and principles, such as human life and human dignity - an especially 
relevant idea after the Second World War - and liberalism and democracy, 
carefully protected among Western European states after 1950. In other words, to 
discuss human rights in terms of regimes requires the important reconciliation of 
the convenient view that regimes lend structure to politics with the far less 
congenial position that rules lend structure to structure (see Onuf and Peterson 
1984:329).   
 
12 After the preceding discussion it is justified to label international human rights instruments 
‘regimes’. 
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The idea of human rights is plagued by difficult-to-reconcile debates at a number 
of levels. Firstly, the understanding of human rights as naturally belonging to 
individual human beings13 opposes the view that they only exist within codes 
agreed collectively that provide a corresponding duty, usually held by an 
authoritative institution.14 Secondly, and related to the above, human rights are 
contested with reference to their spatial applicability. One side, espousing 
Burton’s (1972) ideas on world society, holds that they are universally applicable 
across the globe. The other sees them as socially embedded and only making 
sense if emerging within a certain social context and corresponding to its 
particular conception of the “good life”. The latter view challenges the former’s 
individualist approach as socially destructive by arguing the need for a more 
community-oriented stance (Marx 1987).15 The third distinction refers to 
generations of rights, the most contested one discussing the relative importance of 
civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the 
other. It is a debate of primacy, within which one side holds that without civil and 
political rights no community of people at any level can achieve economic and 
social rights;16 the other side countering that without enjoying economic and 
social rights in the first place it makes no sense to possess the civil and political 
rights.17
 
13 The idea of natural rights is seen as directly linked to the concept of liberalism that evolved in 
Western political thought from the Enlightenment period onwards. Human rights are thus ‘natural’, 
conceived as a moral entitlement which human beings possess in their natural capacity as humans, and 
not by virtue of any special arrangement into which they have entered or of any particular system of 
law under which jurisdiction they fall (Finnis 1980). Locke is arguably the most prominent defender of 
the idea claiming that certain rights self-evidently belong to the individuals as human beings (see 
Locke 1990). 
14 Bentham held that human rights are “nonsense upon stilts” and a contradiction in terms if not 
established by a system of positive law with the corresponding duty of an institution of authority 
(Bentham 1987:53). Relatedly, Burke saw the proclamation of “natural rights” in declarations and 
charters as a socially dangerous and inadequate substitute for effective legislation (Burke 1790).  
15 The individualist approach was defended by Dworkin as a possibility to “trump” collective 
objectives which infringe on individual freedoms (Dworkin 1977: xii). Habermas (2001), on the other 
hand, argued that the very concept of rights makes sense only within a collectivity of individuals who 
agree through deliberation on their exact contents, scope and form. 
16 Sartori (1965) saw it as an inherent feature of any democratic political system that it is the most 
socially and economically vulnerable who will make full use of their civil and political rights in order 
to better their condition. For Cranston (1964, 1967:43-52), economic and social entitlements do not 
satisfy a number of conditions, which prevents one from qualifying them as rights proper.  
17 Beetham (1995:59) defended the view that corresponding duties for economic and social rights are 
assignable and practicable. Relatedly, Wieruszewski (1994:69) attacked the problem of whether 
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ANALYSING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES 
Stemming from the above and vindicating human rights regimes as spanning a 
wide range of possible explanations as to their emergence, there exists most 
broadly two conflicting approaches to analysing them. One holds that states form 
such regimes out of altruistic and ideological reasons. It puts predominant stress 
on the power of ideas to reshape the understanding of national interest (Sikkink 
1993). The outcome is twofold: a willingness to surrender a degree of sovereignty 
and a preparedness to project human rights standards internationally. Through a 
process of transnational socialisation, helped by the inherent “logic of 
appropriateness” of human rights regimes, eventually all states see it as an 
important element of their membership in international society to sign up to them 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Because of the impact of principled ideas and 
norms on identities and interests, the “spiral model” of socialisation easily 
becomes self-sustainable after exerting international pressure solely defined by 
ideological reasoning on hesitant states (Risse and Sikkink 1999:17-35). 
Putting the emphasis on material interests, the other approach informed by realism 
in IR sees human rights as yet another instrument of pursuing geopolitical goals. 
Krasner, who defined international human rights regimes as mechanisms 
“designed to encourage some states to adopt policies that they would not 
otherwise pursue’ (1995: 140), claimed that ‘only when powerful states [had a 
material interest to] enforce principles and norms were [such] regimes 
consequential” (1995: 141).18  Relatedly, Miller (1979) saw human rights as mere 
interests in disguise - a view supported by Herman and Chomsky (1979) who 
accused the US of often abusing the language of human rights in order to ensure  a 
favourable investment climate abroad. Evans (2001) supported this claim by 
defining human rights as the outcome of politics, and human rights regimes as 
reflecting the interests of the hegemon in international relations. 
 
economic and social rights should be taken seriously at all with the problem of how to proceed once 
the inevitable agreement that they should be taken seriously had finally been arrived at. 
18 In his study Krasner took up four cases. Religious toleration was successfully imposed only in the 
17th century in areas where local rulers were too weak to resist (1995:144-52). Slave trade was 
abolished because major European powers, notably Great Britain, vigorously monitored and enforced 
the regime (1995:152-5). The protection of minority rights in Europe in the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th centuries failed because the dominant powers were unwilling to enforce treaty provisions 
(1995:155-61). Finally, the modern regime of individual human rights protection has been only fitfully 
and incompletely accepted, because the most powerful advocates of universal human rights, such as 
the USA and West European states, have not had the resources and inclination to compel or entice 
recalcitrant states to accept such practices (1995:161-4).  
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It is obvious that the above two views are conflicting, but are they mutually 
exclusive? If human rights regimes do indeed span a wide range of categorisations 
within regime theory, e.g. explanations arising out of state interest and 
explanations arising out of their inherent logic of appropriateness, then it makes 
sense to identify analytical dimensions belonging to both sides in analysing any of 
them. Ignatieff (2001) recognised this duly in seeing the complex nature of human 
rights regimes as necessarily implying that different states join them for different 
reasons. Both the politics of interest and the power of ideas exist and are 
observable in different composition in the reasons of every state to become a 
contracting party to a certain human rights instrument. Because it is specific to the 
state parties, this analytical dimension is hard to capture in its totality for any 
given regime only by referring to the regime itself. It does, however, create a 
useful conceptual background to the effort of identifying and analysing four other 
explanatory factors that together establish a framework fit for application across 
the board.   
In the current state of affairs, there are a host of global international human rights 
instruments spread along the issue areas that they codify. Three of them, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the two International 
Covenants of 196619 form the core of the global human rights regime. The 
Covenants span the globe in having almost universal membership. In accordance 
with the UN Charter, there have also been several successful attempts at 
establishing regional human rights regimes open for membership to the states 
within a given region and applicable only within that region. So far there have 
been three such regimes: (1) the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); (2) the 1969 American Convention 
on Human Rights (the American Convention); and (3) the 1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter). In the Asian continent it has 
not yet been possible to establish a regime of a comparable level of detail.  
Bearing in mind the above, the question arises: how can we explain the emergence 
of those regional regimes in broad enough terms that are valid for all? Each of 
them, of course, has its own idiosyncrasy based on the interaction among its 
contracting parties and their motives to participate. If, however, commonality 
exists this makes it possible to construct through comparison a generalisable 
model of analysis – a line of research that has been well defined and defended by 
 
19 These are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
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Landman (2002). After all, the resemblance that regional human rights regimes 
have with each other are hardly coincidental (Onuf and Peterson 1984:338). 
Starting from the background analytical dimension, that interest and ideology are 
simultaneously present in the foundations of any of them, the following is an 
attempt to identify an explanatory framework empirically based across the regions 
where such regimes exist. 
To start with, there is the important element of historical context generating a 
certain geopolitical interest in establishing each of the regimes. The end of the 
Second World War, dubbed the “human rights war”,20 brought home the 
realisation that codifying certain norms and monitoring their implementation is 
indispensable to the effort of avoiding its recurrence. This realisation gave the 
necessary political impetus to initiate the creation of the global human rights 
regime in the first place. Completing the dimension of historical context is the 
following sharp ideological division of political doctrine between East and West, 
which resulted in a bi-polar world of enhanced cohesion within both sides and 
prolonged confrontation among them. It split the global regime in two parts (i.e. 
the two International Covenants) and, more importantly, provoked the geopolitical 
interest of both Western Europe and the USA21 in establishing human rights 
regimes making political authoritarianism less likely.  
For similar reasons, Eastern Europe remained without a human rights regime 
while, in the post-colonial context, Africa responded to the predominantly 
individualist conception adopted by Western liberal democracies with a more 
socially oriented instrument codifying a host of collective duties and rights within 
its norms. Thus diversity, for the most part, arose out of the context within which 
the regional regimes were established. It materialised in the set of rights enshrined 
by the given instrument and, relatedly, the nature and degree of effectiveness of 
the implementation mechanism it contains. The European system of human rights 
protection personified by the ECHR, for example, restricted itself to civil and 
political rights “necessary in a democratic society”, and did not accord much 
prominence to rights contributing to an “ideal commonwealth” (Robertson 
 
20 “The last [the Second World] War was essentially the ‘human rights’ war, inflicted on peoples by 
those who espoused a monstrous racist doctrine, and waged simultaneously against man and the 
community of men, with unprecedented systematic cruelty” (René Cassin at a Press Conference on 8 
July 1947, quoted in Leben 1999: 87). 
21 Donnelly (1986:625, 637) found a reasonable explanation for the establishment of the American 
Convention in the dominant power of the USA, which employed its hegemonic status to ensure the 
regime’s creation and support its operation. 
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1982:83, van Dijk and van Hoof 1990, Vasak 1982). By contrast, the American 
Convention, drawing on the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man, incorporated a wide set of social and economic rights, owing to the 
negative effect that unemployment and social exclusion have had on Latin 
American societies (Panizza 1993, Panizza 1995:187).  
In its turn, the Charter of Banjul, establishing the regime of human rights 
protection within the Organisation of African Unity, added a rather 
comprehensive set of social duties towards the family, the nation and the state (see 
Espielli 1982, M’Baye 1982, Ndiaye 1982, Kaballo, 1995). Howard (1986:15-7) 
saw this as the outcome of the specific set of social values characteristic of the 
African continent, whereby life is communal and decision-making is consensual 
and distributive. Finally, in Asia, a human rights regime spanning all the continent 
still remains a remote eventuality (see Halliday 1995, Christie 1995, Yamane 
1982, Boutros-Ghali 1982). The Cairo Declaration of 1990 and the Bangkok 
declaration of 199322 demonstrate a certain level of agreement, but fall short of 
establishing a fully fledged regional human rights regime containing a 
comprehensive set of rights and determining an implementation mechanism.23
The above description leads to the second analytical dimension in conceptualising 
regional human rights regimes. It is derived from Dower’s (1998) idea of 
distinguishing between systems of global and regional ethics. Regional human 
rights regimes prove to be much more suitable than their global counterparts in 
grasping and adapting to regional ethics. They aptly pay attention to local 
circumstances and benefit from a regionally-tailored approach, which does 
nevertheless incorporate certain universal principles. Being “the local bearers of a 
global burden” (Vincent 1986:95), regional human rights regimes are consistent 
with the ideas of IR theorists, for whom the world of states is organised in an 
 
22 The Bangkok Declaration of April 1993 preceded the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and 
was a regional, Asia Pacific, contribution to the Vienna Declaration along with the Tunis Declaration 
of November 1992 and the San José Declaration of January 1993 (see Boyle 1995:80-1).  
23 The implementation mechanisms of these regimes also differ substantially. ECHR (see  
Hhttp://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htmH) only incorporated individual 
complaints later in its development. The judgements of the Court in Strasbourg, however, have had an 
enormous effect on domestic legislation regarding the protection of human rights. Within the 
American Convention (see Hhttp://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic3.htmH) states were obliged to 
accept individual complaints.  However, its Court has been less influential. Finally, the African Charter 
(see  Hhttp://www.hrcr.org/docs/Banjul/afrhr.htmlH) resorts to the well-established but much less 
effective mechanism of periodical state reporting and monitoring compliance. The Cairo Declaration is 
available at Hhttp://www.humanrights.harvard.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairo_dec.htmH and the 
Bangkok Declaration at Hhttp://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=830H
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international society exhibiting various layers of cohesion and commonality 
embedded in each other (Bull 1977, Buzan 2004). Regional instruments bring the 
analysis one level down, which opens the space for a more detailed codification in 
terms of human rights of the system of regionally specific ethics of interaction 
between states, and between states and the individuals under their jurisdiction. 
Thirdly, and related to their embeddedness within a stronger social environment, 
regional human rights regimes emerge as counterweight to the realisation that 
ratification of global instruments may not be even a crude guide to the actual 
commitment to human rights protection in the contemporary world (Vincent 
1986:99, Falk 1981:33). Indeed, as Landman (2001) and Keith (1999) 
demonstrated empirically, the bigger number of states signing up to global human 
rights regimes does not necessarily imply an improvement in the standard of 
protection. Regional regimes are thus a way to withdraw the possibility for states 
to reap the legitimacy of being party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, for example, without bearing the costs of compliance.24 They are 
an expressed manifestation of the interest on the part of their contracting parties in 
mutually binding each other to a certain mode of political behaviour, thus 
extracting a stronger commitment to implementation than the global regimes. This 
idea relates positively with Moravcsik’s (2000) republican liberalism thesis 
explaining the creation of the ECHR.25
Finally, regional regimes appear to be the best operationalisation of the division 
between jus commune and jus proprium in human rights norms. Leben (1999) 
conceptualised it as the fundamental distinction in human rights protection that is 
observed at each level of analysis. At the regional level, it separates the individual 
understanding of human rights protection by each state (jus proprium) from the 
dispositions shared across the region (jus commune). The bigger the latter, the 
more ground for creating an effective regional human rights regime. The division 
can be seen as mirroring internationally, at a higher level of analysis, the 
reconciliation of individual moralities held by autonomous persons within 
bounded political communities (Ingram 2002:217-8) and relates the creation of 
regional regimes to the political theory of reconciling conflicting claims to rights.  
 
24 This statement must be qualified as, no doubt, some regional regimes are more effective than others. 
Among its counterparts, the most far-reaching are the effects produced by the ECHR, which remains 
the “jewel in the crown” in human rights protection (Lalumiére 1993:xv). 
25 Moravcsik (2000:225-8) claimed that the self-interest on the part of its contracting parties to “lock 
in” democratic rule domestically and abroad through the enforcement of human rights, was essential in 
the creation of the ECHR. 
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In view of the above, it is important to analyse regional regimes as initially 
originating from the human rights jus commune within the region and 
subsequently sustaining and developing it. Such regimes are never constructed on 
tabula rasa (Dower, 1998). They draw norms from both one level up - the global 
human rights regimes, and one level down - the national constitutions and legal 
systems of their contracting parties. The case of the ECHR is particularly relevant 
here. Its norms combined much of what was already codified by the ICCPR with 
the common traditions of the participating states. In the words of one of its 
creators: 
…[t]he nations of western Europe [were] co-heirs to an inheritance, a 
common heritage [in need of] protection. It was only necessary to make 
a comparison of the provisions in the constitutions, declarations of 
rights, statutes and customary laws […] with reference to human rights 
[in order to extract] the points of resemblance (Teitgen 1993:3). 
The just commune on which the Convention could be based was thus particularly 
large. Relatedly, the operation of the Convention itself and the case-law of its 
Court time and again reinforced and re-interpreted this jus commune by requiring 
“guilty” governments to amend legislation, grant human rights remedies or pay 
monetary damage to claimants (Carter and Trimble 1995: 309). 
These four analytical dimensions, historical context, regional ethics, commitment 
to implementation and jus commune, form a coherent conceptual framework for 
the understanding of regional human rights regimes. It is embedded in both the 
wider regime theory and the resulting two contrasting approaches to explaining 
state motives for signing up to human rights instruments. As much as these 
dimensions are relevant in the analysis of the regional human rights regimes 
placed at the level immediately below the global, it is not self-evident whether 
they can be successfully utilised at an even lower level of analysis. The case of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is particularly relevant in this regard as it 
represents an effort of sub-regional norm codification. Is the so constructed 
analytical framework adequate for its analysis or does the Charter present it with 
irreconcilable conceptual tensions? An answer to this question is the objective of 
the remainder of the article. 
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ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  
If the subject-matter of human rights presents regime theory with interesting 
horizons, so does the European experience among its counterparts. It stands out as 
the environment where norms and principles have found their strongest support 
and have generated a considerable compliance pull beyond what other regional 
human rights regimes have managed to secure within their geographical remits. 
Yet it seems to be on the verge of splitting, following the creation of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The latter represents an ontologically separate 
level of analysis in representing a human rights regime within an already existing 
regional regime, the ECHR. The Charter is influenced by, and borrows from the 
Convention in many respects. But does it also create another epistemological level 
of analysis by introducing analytical dimensions additional to those already 
established above? In other words, can the creation of the Charter be explained 
through reference to historical context, regional ethics, stronger commitment to 
implementation and jus commune, or does it make those irrelevant and require the 
introduction of additional analytical concepts? 
Before engaging with these questions, a few words on the Charter are in order. 
The idea for its creation acquired the first joint high-level public acknowledgment 
at the European Council of Cologne in June 1999 during the German Presidency 
of the European Union.26 The member-state executives agreed to give a mandate 
to a special body, whose composition was to be decided by the end of the same 
year, to start working on the text. After several months of discussing which 
institutions should be represented in the drafting convention and how, the 1999 
Tampere European Council defined its representation to include national 
governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the Commission, 
with representatives of the European Court of Justice involved as observers. Work 
commenced soon after that and at the Nice Summit at the end of 2000, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council solemnly proclaimed its 
outcome: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union consisting of 
 
26 “Presidency conclusions of the Cologne European Council”, 3-4 June 1999, European Council 
Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at 
Hhttp://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htmH. 
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seven sections and fifty four articles and containing no implementation 
mechanism.27  
In comparison to the three regional human rights regimes considered in the first 
part of the article, the Charter stands out as a qualitatively new type. It not only 
binds the EU member states, but also the Union’s common institutions. This has 
not been the case with the Council of Europe, the Organization of American 
States or the Organization of African Unity. In addition, its ratification by the 
contacting parties is not independent but forms an integral part of the process of 
ratifying the so-called Constitutional Treaty of the Union finalised in June 2003. 
As things stand now, a cursory reference to the Charter is included in the main 
body of the latter, while the full text is attached as its second part. The articles of 
the Charter envisage no implementation mechanism and contain no provisions 
creating a special organ charged with monitoring its application, which 
distinguishes it as well from the other three regional human rights regimes.  
The Charter does indeed seem to be incomparable to them in many respects. 
However, since it involves the authorities of sovereign states in a regulatory 
framework of behaviour in relation to the people under their jurisdiction, it makes 
sense to treat it on a par with other human rights regimes. It is a peculiar 
document in a particular context and in its preparation involved many different 
institutional actors including members of the European Parliament, members of 
national member-state parliaments, representatives of member-state governments 
and representatives of the European Commission. This distinguishes it from 
classic human rights instruments, both regional and global, which are usually 
drafted by governmental representatives and submitted for subsequent 
parliamentary approval and ratification. In addition, the Charter was prepared 
within a peculiar framework among other international organizations – the EU is 
not a state, nevertheless possesses far-reaching authority within its field of 
competence. These are the arguments against qualifying the Charter as a regional 
human rights regime. 
On the other hand, the charter looks very similar to an international human rights 
instrument. It repeats normal standards contained in a number of existing and 
 
27 Three years later the text of the Charter, which formed Part Two of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
of the European Union presented by D’Estaing to the Heads of State at Thessaloniki on 20th June 2003, 
contained some amendments in Section VII – General Provisions. A modest implementation 
mechanism has been established by the European Parliament through the appointment of a network of 
experts (the Human Rights League) with recognised authority in human rights matters with the task to 
assess the implementation of each of the rights listed in the Charter (see De Schutter 2003:4). 
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operative international documents that have guided state behaviour, including the 
behaviour of EU member states for decades now. And most importantly, it limits 
state power with regard to the people under their authority. The potential 
argument that since the EU is not a state, it is not strictly state power that the 
Charter limits, holds little ground. The fact that the EU, through its institutions, 
possesses any powers at all is only attributable to a location of primary 
sovereignty, i.e. that of its member states. The power it yields can thus only be 
satisfactorily conceptualised as an extension of state power. The EU has it no 
more than by the exclusive consent of its members. And since none of the human 
rights regimes binding these states contains self-executing norms that apply for 
every authority to which they extend their power, there is a need for a special 
regime when the latter escapes the remit of the former. In these circumstances, the 
Charter is needed to remedy this discrepancy by a subsequent regulation of the 
pooled authority of the Union resulting from the gradual transferral of state 
power. 
Most broadly, there are four points justifying the qualification of the Charter as a 
regional human rights regime and not just an EU specific code of rights. Firstly, it 
contains articles that are hardly relevant for the EU, such as the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.28 The reason for including such a 
provision is not due to the risk of the European Commission becoming an agent of 
torture, but more likely due to the wish to demonstrate the belonging of the 
Charter to the family of human rights regimes. Secondly, and as already discussed 
above, the Charter is clearly a measure against an institution yielding power over 
the people in its authority. Thirdly, the Charter visually looks like an international 
human rights instrument of the type of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 or the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The latter two were not officially 
ratified or even signed, but proclaimed just as the Charter was at Nice in 
December 2000. Nevertheless, their belonging to the family of human rights 
regimes is uncontested. Finally, the discourse during the Convention drafting the 
Charter is well indicative of its nature as a human rights regime as it emphasised 
the universal dimension of fundamental rights and underlined commonalities 
rather than distinctions. The main points of reference in the drafting process were 
global norms and rules, agreed upon and accepted by organisations beyond the 
national or EU level, and even beyond the Council of Europe (see Lerch, 2003:6). 
 
28 Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 66  
Considering the most fundamental dimension of analysis, that of the combination 
between ideology and interests in state motives behind signing up to it, the 
Charter makes the first step of fitting positively into the conceptual model. The 
calculation of its contracting parties indeed exhibits both the politics of interest 
and the power of ideas in prompting them to consent to its creation. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to analyse the composition of motives for every EU 
member state. Instead the case of Germany, the main proponent of the idea of the 
Charter, is taken up below. 
In terms of nation-state identity, following the catastrophe of the Second World 
War, Germany underwent a process of its thorough and profound reconstruction 
and based it on the three pillars of Christianity, democracy and social market 
economy. European integration proved to be the most potent anchor for it and, as 
a result, Germany had been the staunchest supporter of various policies within the 
European Union, including EU-specific human rights codification. In the current 
government, it was the ideological conviction of the Green Party on the normative 
inappropriateness of continuing the process of economic integration without an 
explicit and specific human rights regime for the Union, that played a central role 
in the creation of the Charter.  
The idea was laid down in the coalition agreement, with which the party entered 
government (Eicke 2000), figured in its Chapter IX Sicherheit für alle – 
Bürgerrrechte stärken under the heading “EU Initiatives” and its promotion was 
taken very seriously by the Party chief and Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joschka 
Fischer (Tarschys 2003:170). Consequently, upon commencement of its Union 
Presidency in January 1999, the German government included in its programme 
Europe’s Path into the 21st Century a commitment that EU policies must 
demonstrably protect human rights so that European decisions are meaningful to 
its people (Miller 2000).  
Besides the power of ideas, however, the promotion of the Charter was also 
dictated by the political interest of preserving the compatibility of the legal orders 
of the Union and Germany. The German Constitutional Court is legally required 
to ensure the screening of legislation operative within the country’s boundaries for 
conformity with the national constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights 
(grundrechte). In at least a couple of cases in the 1990’s it held that as long as an 
adequate standard of fundamental rights protection was not offered under EU law, 
it would not regard itself precluded from scrutinising Union measures for 
conformity with German fundamental rights, and where necessary, from 
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invalidating or disapplying such measures within Germany (Shaw 2000:345). 
Supporting the idea of the Charter has thus been a continuous interest of the 
German political establishment.  
In terms of historical context, the end of the Cold War in Europe in the late 1980’s 
presented the Union with a challenge of self-reflection, with an effect that was 
similar to the one that the end of Second World War had on the creation of global 
and regional human rights regimes. There were two main mechanisms through 
which it worked. Firstly, the Union faced an unprecedented number of 
membership applications, which made its upcoming enlargement  incomparable to 
any previous ones (Hafner 1999:783). There had been human rights conditionality 
before,29 but not in same explicit format as the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for 
membership.30 One of the important reasons for this is the fact that most of the 
applicant states have post-communist, newly democratised political systems with 
little tradition and experience in human rights protection, and this logically 
generates  “nervousness about how authority [will be] exercised within an Union 
[that includes states] with weak and short liberal democratic traditions” (Duff 
2000). 
Secondly, and related to the above idea that the Charter is provoked by the 
historical context of opening up the Union to newly democratised states, is the 
fact that in the 1990’s the ECHR as a regional human rights regime stretched far 
beyond its original design and, as a result, diminished its capability of ensuring 
the desired commitment to implementation. By 1999 the ECHR was ratified by 
more than forty-one states, almost half of which only recently emerged from the 
human-rights unfriendly grips of communism. In such circumstances, the Union is 
justified in fearing that the human rights regime that has served its development 
for more than four decades (De Schuter 2003) is perhaps becoming overstrained 
and less effective in monitoring compliance. In this respect it is relevant to note 
that among the sources of the Charter’s provisions, the ECHR stands out as the 
 
29 Most relevant are the examples of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were newly democratised in 
the 1970’s when they applied for Union membership. For a comparative analysis of the role of the EU 
in their democratisation see Bojkov (2000). 
30 The Copenhagen membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved: (1) 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (3) the ability to take on the 




THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 68  
                                                
most oft-used one, which transpires as well in the explanatory memorandum 
commissioned by the Presidium31 demonstrating which rights in the Charter are 
equivalent to those contained in the ECHR.  
The latter explanation links two of the analytical dimensions discussed in the 
previous part, historical context and commitment to implementation, in addressing 
the Charter. At the sub-regional level of analysis represented by the European 
Union, they prove to be relevant conceptualisations for its newly established 
human rights regime. It can be reasonably claimed that the dimensions of regional 
ethics and jus commune are also pertinent analytical tools. Regional ethics would 
conceptualise the Charter as marking the Union’s transition from the ethics of 
economic integration that at times contravenes human rights considerations32 to 
the ethics of reaching its finalité (Menéndez 2003) as a fully-fledged human rights 
organisation (Von Bogdany 2000). Jus commune would in turn stress the Cologne 
mandate stating that “the European Council believes that this Charter should 
contain the fundamental rights and freedoms […] derived from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States”.33 Evidently, the Charter benefits from a 
wide jus commune stemming from the liberal democratic constitutions of the EU 
members. 
But this is not all. There are two additional analytical dimensions that were not 
discussed earlier, since they are irrelevant for the creation of the three regional 
human rights regimes, but are extremely relevant in the analysis of the Charter. 
They stem from the characteristics of the European Union as a unit of analysis 
that has gone far beyond the classic international regime or organisation (Peters 
1999:133) and has acquired a number of sui generis systemic properties justifying 
treating it as an instance of nothing other than itself (Rosamond 2000:15). The 
latter point has led some authors in their effort to analyse the EU with the help of 
comparative politics (Hix 1994) and to define it as a political system closely 
resembling the domestic political organisation of nation states (Hix 1999). It is in 
this respect that the dimensions of legitimacy and constitutionalism need to be 
added in analysing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 
31 Convention document CHARTE 4473/00. 
32 Maclaren (2000) held that often the choices of national governments in protecting their citizens’ 
economic and social rights are constrained for the sake of implementing measures promoting the 
global competitiveness and functioning of the common market of the Union. 
33 “Presidency Conclusion of the Cologne European Council”, 3-4 June 1999, European Council 
Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at 
Hhttp://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htmH
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Legitimacy is related to the fact that the Charter fulfils the function of legitimating 
the integration project in which member-state governments have involved their 
countries, and which is recognised as increasingly alienating the ordinary citizen. 
Schönalu (2001), for example, saw the process of creating the Charter within the 
drafting Convention as a revealing debate over the fundamental values keeping 
the Union together and giving it legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. It is 
uncontested that the Charter deepens the human rights legitimacy of the Union 
beyond what the ECHR is able to provide in terms of making sure that its 
contracting parties respect the norms they have signed up to in all their activities. 
The latter has become largely ineffective in controlling the Union due to the 
gradual “clever sleight of hand” (De Schutter 2003:5) by which EU member states 
transferred powers to the common institutions without making sure that they are 
bound in the same way as by the ECHR. 
Both texts related to the Charter contain direct reference to legitimacy and 
improved visibility of fundamental rights within the Union. The Cologne 
Conclusions held that the “protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle 
of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy”. It also noted 
that “there appears to be a need […] to establish a Charter of fundamental rights 
in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to the 
Union's citizens”.34 Reaffirming those statements, the draft presented at the Nice 
summit  saw the Union as contributing to the preservation and development of 
common values, to which end “it is necessary to strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights […] by making [them] more visible in a Charter”.35 Such 
references point undoubtedly to the motivation shared by all EU member states to 
create the regime of the Charter in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
integration project that they are part of. 
The dimension of constitutionalism is supported by Castiglione’s (2002) idea to 
see reasons of constitutional procedure behind creating the Charter. The 
Convention drafting was later repeated at a higher level in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe charged with preparing the Union’s Constitution. It preserved 
similar mechanism of work and was composed of a similar ratio of representatives 
of national governments, parliaments and Union institutions. The Charter itself 
found its place in the outcome of the work of the second Convention, which alone 
provides a perfect justification for why it was created in the first place. This also 
 
34 Ibid. 
35 Charter Preamble - Hhttp://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text_en.pdfH
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proves to be a reasonable explanation for why the Charter does not contain any 
implementation mechanism, since Constitutional Bills of Rights usually do not. 
Relatedly, the greatly increased powers of governance of Union institutions in 
comparison to the first decades of its existence necessarily invites a more vigorous 
re-consideration of its objectives and guiding principles.36 Rearranging the treaties 
has been an issue of long standing in EU politics, and in the absence of treaty-
enshrined protection of fundamental rights, it was the European Court of Justice 
that laid the initial foundations vindicating their respect and within its efforts of 
constitutionalising the Union declared them as “general principles” of Union law 
(Weiler 1999:107). Such status, however, has been seen as unsatisfactory since, in 
the potential clash between community objectives enjoying firm legal basis in the 
treaties and human rights defended merely as “general principles”, the former will 
naturally enjoy priority (Meehan 2000). It is precisely this inconsistency that the 
Charter, being part of a wider constitutional process, addresses. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
If the subject-matter of human rights presents regime theory with interesting 
horizons, so does the European experience among its regional counterparts. It 
stands out as the environment where norms and principles have found their 
strongest support and have generated a considerable compliance pull. Two 
explanations are advanced in addressing this outcome. Europe is the historical 
source of the idea of human rights (Leben 1999) and it played a prominent part in 
“the ruthless and wholesale destruction of individuals and groups” and in “the 
extreme deterioration” of relations between states and their people (Szabo 
1982:21). The ECHR is currently being supplemented with another regime that 
has the potential to further and strengthen the protection of human rights in 
Europe in the years to come. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights lends itself to analysis based on the broad 
conceptual framework constructed with reference to the European, American and 
African human rights regimes. It is defined by historical context, is a reflection of 
particular regional ethics, and promotes a strong commitment to implementation. 
It steps on the wide jus commune of human rights norms available across the 
 
36 The Charter can thus be seen as addressing the greatly increased powers of governance acquired by 
EU institutions and the emerging possibility that, as these powers are exercised, human rights within 
the Union will inevitably be affected (Goldsmith 2000). 
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liberal democratic member states of the European Union. However, the Charter 
also introduces two additional analytical dimensions: legitimacy and 
constitutionalism. They appear irrelevant in the analysis of the other three regional 
regimes, since none of them were aimed at legitimising or constitutionalising the 
organisation that provided the framework for their establishment, but are 
indispensable in conceptualising the Charter itself. 
The need for broadening the analytical perspective arises out of the specificity of 
the Charter and the specificity of the political domain within which it emerged – 
the European Union. On the one hand, the Union certainly presents regime theory 
with a substantial empirical strain. It cannot be simply analysed as a group of 
rational states for whom cooperation and its regulation is defined without any 
reference to norms and principled ideas. On the other hand, the Charter itself 
bears a multiple identity representing an interesting combination of two poles: a 
constitutional bill of rights with partial resemblance to domestic human rights 
guarantees in liberal democracies, and a veritable regional human rights regime of 
the type that helped articulate the analytical dimensions of historical context, 
regional ethics, commitment to implementation and jus commune. 
The Charter proves to represent a separate level of the analysis both ontologically 
and epistemologically. It goes one step further than the three regional human 
rights regimes in its relation to both the organisation within which it emerged and 
the member states forming it. Ontologically, it is a qualitatively different human 
rights regime which in its specificity comes close to a constitutional bill of rights. 
Epistemologically, it widens the framework of analysing such regimes by 




THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 72  
REFERENCES 
 
Beetham, David (1995) “What Nature for Economic and Social Rights?” in David Beetham 
(ed.) Politics and Human Rights. 21-49. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Beitz, Chalres (2003) “What Human Rights Mean”, Dædalus 132(1). 36-46. 
Bentham, Jeremy (1987) “Anarchical Fallacies” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense upon 
Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, 43-56. London: Methuen. 
Bojkov, Victor D. (2001) The European Union and Democratisation in Small European 
States. Venezia: Marsilio Editori, EMA Awarded Theses Collection, Vol. 3. 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1982) “The League of Arab States” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The 
International Dimensions of Human Rights, 3-10. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Boyle, Kevin (1995) “Stock-Taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna 1993” in David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 79-95. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (1984) “Introduction” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds) 
The Expansion of International Society, 1-9. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burke, Edmund (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France. New York: P.F. Collier & Son 
(edited by C. Eliot, the Harvard Classics Series, Vol. 24, Part 3). 
Burton, John (1972) World Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, Barry (1993) “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism 
ad Regime Theory Meet the English School”, International Organization 47(3): 327-352. 
Buzan, Barry (1995) “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered” 
in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theory Today, 23-49. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Buzan, Barry (2004, forthcoming) International Society and World Society: English School 
Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Carter, Barry E. and Phillip R. Trimble (1995) International Law. Boston: Little Brown. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 73  
Castiglione, Dario (2002) “From the Charter to the Constitution of Europe? Notes on the 
Constitutionalisation Process in the EU”, Queens Paper on Europeanisation 5/2002, Queens 
University of Belfast available from:< http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies/onlinepapers/poe5-02.pdf> 
Christie, Kenneth (1995) “Regime Security and Human Rights in Southeast Asia” In David 
Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 204-218. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Cranston, Maurice (1964) What are Human Rights? New York: Basic Books.  
Cranston, Maurice (1967) “Human Rights, Real and Supposed” in David D. Raphael (ed.) 
Political Theory and the Rights of Man, 112-148. London: Macmillan. 
De Schutter, Olivier (2003) “The Questions to be Decided: Protecting Fundamental Rights - an 
Issue in the Convention on the Future of Europe” Expert commentary available from: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/questions.html> 
Donnelly, Jack (1986) “International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis”, International 
Organization 40(3): 599-642. 
Dower, Nigel (1998) “Human Rights, Global Ethics and Globalisation” in Roland Axtmann 
(ed.) Globalisation and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, 201-232. London: 
Pinder. 
Duff, Andrew (2000) “Towards a European Federal Society” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and Commentaries, 67-89. London: Kogan Page. 
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth. 
Eicke, Tim (2000) “The European Charter of Fundamental Rights – Unique Opportunity or 
Unwelcome Distraction”, European Human Rights Law Review 3(2): 280-296. 
Espiell, Héctor G. (1982) “The Organization of African States (OAS)” in Karel Vasak (ed.) 
The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 543-574. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Evans, Tim (2001) The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective. London: Pluto Press. 
Falk, Richard (1981) Human Rights and State Sovereignty. New York: Holmes and Meier. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change”. International Orgnaization 52(4): 887-917. 
Finnis, John (1980) Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 74  
Goldsmith, Peter, QC (2000) “Consolidation of Fundamental Rights at EU Level: The British 
Perspective” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and 
Commentaries, 45-53. London: Kogan Page. 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001) The Post National Constellation: Political Essays. London: Polity 
Press (translated, edited and introduced by Max Pensky).  
Hafner, Danica F. (1999) “Dilemmas in Managing the Expanding EU: the EU and Applicant 
States’ Points of View”, Journal of European Public Policy 6(5): 783-801. 
Halliday, Fred (1995) “Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: The Case of the Islamic 
Middle East” in David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 152-167. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger (1997) Theories of International 
Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1979) The Political Economy of Human Rights. 
Boston: South End Press. 
Hix, Simon (1994) “The Study of the European Community: the Challenge to Comparative 
Politics”, West European Politics 17(1), 1-30. 
Hix, Simon (1999) The Political System of the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Howard, Rhoda (1986) “Is there an African Concept of Human Rights” in John R. Vincent 
(ed.) Foreign Policy and Human Rights, 11-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hurrell, Andrew J. (1995) “International Society and Regimes: A Reflective Approach” in 
Volker Rittberger (ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations, 49-72. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Ignatieff, Michael (2001) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
Ingram, Attracta (2002) A Political Theory of Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jones, Peter (1994) Rights: Issues in Political Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Kaballo, Sidgi (1995) “Human Rights and Democratization in Africa” in David Beetham (ed.) 
Politics and Human Rights, 189-203. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Keith, Linda C. (1999) “The United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behaviour?”, Journal of Peace Research 
36(1), 95-118. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 75  
Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1989a) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. (1989b) “Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics” in 
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory, 78-102. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston: Little Brown. 
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. (1983a) International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1983b) “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables” in Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) International Regimes, 56-82. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1995) “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights” in Volker Rittberger 
(ed.) Regime Theory and International Relations, 139-167. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1984) “Thrasymmachos Revisited: On the Relevance of Norms and the 
Study of Law for International Relations”, Journal of International Affairs 37(2), 343-361 
Lalumiére, Catherine (1993) “Human Rights in Europe: Challenges for the Next Millennium” 
In R. St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds) The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights. xii-xvi. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
Landman, Todd (2001) Measuring the Human Rights Regime. (Paper presented at the 97th 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, Fall 2001.) 
Landman, Todd (2002) “Comparative Politics and Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 
24(4): 890-923. 
Leben, Charles (1999) “Is there a European Approach to Human Rights?” in Philip Alston 
(ed.) The EU and Human Rights, 69-98. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lerch, Marika (2003) “European Identity in International Society: A Constructivist Analysis of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”. Constitutionalism Web Papers, ConWEB No. 2/2003, 
available from: < http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/> 
Locke, John (1990) Questions Concerning the Law of Nature. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
edited and introduced by R. Horowitz, J. Clay and D. Clay. 
Marx, Karl (1987) “On the Jewish Question” in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense upon Stilts: 
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, 34-52. London: Methuen. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 76  
M’Baye, Kéba (1982) “Human Rights in Africa” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 583-600. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Maclaren, David (2000) “Economic Rights in Contemporary Europe” on Linda Hancock and 
Chris O’Brien (eds) Rewriting Rights in Europe, 76-92. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Meehan, Michael (2000) “(Un)charted Waters: the Legal Background to Fundamental Rights 
Protection in the EU” in Kim Feus (ed.) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Text and 
Commentaries, 81-112. London: Kogan Page. 
Menéndez, Agustín J. (2003) “Finalité through Rights” in Erik Eriksen, John Fossum and 
Agustín Menéndez (eds) The Chartering of Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its Constitutional Implications, 34-51. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Miller, Bruce (1979) “Morality, Interests and Rationalization” on Ralph Pettman (ed.) Moral 
Claims in World Affairs, 31-59. London: Croom Helm. 
Miller, Vaughne (2000) Human Rights in the EU: the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
(Research Paper 00/32, 20 March 2000, House of Commons Library.) 
Milner, Helen V. (1997) Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Policies and 
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (2000) The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe. International Organization 54(2), 217-52.  
Moul, William B. (1973) “The Levels of Analysis Problem Revisited”, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 61(1), 494-513. 
Ndiaye, Birame (1982) “The Place of Human Rights in the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 601-615. 
Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Onuf, Nicholas G. and V. Spike Peterson (1984) “Human Rights from an International 
Regimes Perspective”, Journal of International Affairs 37(2), 329-342 
Panizza, Francisco (1993) “Human Rights: Global Culture and Social Fragmentation”, Bulletin 
of Latin American Research 12(4), 198-227. 
Panizza, Francisco (1995) “Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of 
Democracy in Latin America” on David Beetham (ed.) Politics and Human Rights, 168-188. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Peters, Guy B. (1999) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’. 
London: Pinter. 
IJIS Volume 2
V. BOJKOV – INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 77  
Puchala, Donald J. and R. F. Hopkins (1983) “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive 
Analysis” in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, 25-42. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) “The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction” in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Popp and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, 1-38. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rittberger, Volker, ed. (1995) Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Robertson, Arthur H. (1982) Human Rights in the World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1965) Democratic Theory. New York: Praeger. 
Schönalu, Justus (2001) The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Legitimation through 
Deliberation. PhD Dissertation, University of Reading. 
Shaw, Jo (2000) Law of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Sikkink, Kathryn (1993) “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United 
States and Western Europe” in Judih Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds) Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 43-59. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Szabo, Imre (1982) “Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments” 
in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights, 11-40. Westport: 
Greenwood Press. 
Tarschys, Daniel (2003) “Goal Congestion: Multi-Purpose Governance in the European 
Union” in Erik O. Eriksen, John E. Fossum and Agustín J. Menéndez (eds) The Chartering of 
Europe: The European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications, 
161-178. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Teitgen, Pierre-Henri (1993) “Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights” in 
R. St. J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds) The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights. 3-14. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.  
Van Dijk, P. and van Hoof, G. J. H. (1990) Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. 
IJIS Volume 2
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NO. 2 (2004) 
 
 78  
Vasak, Karel (1982) “The Council of Europe” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 457-542. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Vincent, John R. (1986) Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Von Bogdany, Armin (2000) “The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human 
Rights and the Core of the European Union” Common Market Law Review 37(6): 1307-1338. 
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1999) The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wieruszewski, Roman (1994) “Some Comments Concerning the Concept of Economic and 
Social Rights” in Karl Drzewicki (ed.) Social Rights as Human Rights: A European Challenge. 
Åbo Academy University: Institute for Human Rights. 
Yamane, Hiroko (1982) “Asia and Human Rights” in Karel Vasak (ed.) The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, 651-670. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
Young, Oran (1994) International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless 
Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
IJIS Volume 2
